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Abstract 
Promoting affordability and a ‘Should Cost’ policy in defense acquisitions 
involves a series of decision epochs that lead up to end procurement of a desired 
sustainable capability. Often times the number of decision variables, coupled with 
programmatic uncertainties, leads to a decision problem that can quickly exceed the 
mental faculties of the decision-maker. Yet these decision problems, especially early 
on, directly impact cost, schedule and performance in subsequent decision-epochs. 
Our research under this grant leverages techniques from the fields of operations 
research towards improving multi-period decision-making in defense acquisitions. 
Our work extends prior developed portfolio tools to include a framework that can 
handle complex interdependencies between technical and programmatic dimensions 
of acquisitions, bearing multi-epoch consideration in mind. We provide 
representative case study analyses to illustrate application of methods in identifying 
optimal acquisition strategies and investment policies. 
Keywords: affordability, defense acquisition, system-of-system, operations 
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Executive Summary 
The US Department of Defense (DoD) has emphasized a need for Better 
Buying Power initiatives in tackling issues of increasing costs, schedule growths and 
programmatic failures that stem from complex cascading failures across highly 
interdependent military assets. The management of warfighting portfolios through a 
‘Should Cost’ technique becomes increasingly difficult as acquisition practitioners 
leverage performance against various measures of risk, bearing military asset 
interdependencies in mind.  
Balancing support warfighter activities whilst maintaining affordability of 
programs throughout the acquisition lifecycle is a challenge. The need to reduce 
cost and promote adequate competition and growth of technological options in 
developing military capabilities has further increased the complexity of the 
acquisition process. This increase in complexity now includes the need to account 
for competitive elements in contracting, improving productivity and reducing 
unnecessary redundancies. Prior research by the authors has employed financial 
engineering tools to establish a robust investment portfolio approach as a means of 
exploring acquisition trade space by balancing capability and cost of a ‘portfolio’ of 
military assets against various metrics of acquisition risk. The risk measure in the 
portfolio framework addresses cascading effect of interdependencies that exist 
between interconnected systems. The presented research extends the prior work 
and supports the Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative by incorporating decision-
support strategies from system of systems engineering, financial engineering and 
operations research to support the sequential nature of acquisition decision-making 
that typically exists in managing portfolios of military assets. Three techniques are 
explored1) policy construction for cost and schedule overruns using mechanism 
design 2) a strategic level robust multi-period portfolio problem and 3) a multi-period 
portfolio formulation that leverages decision epoch updates for sequential decision-
making. The proposed strategies support acquisitions, both in the pre- and post- 
milestone B phases, and exploit current initiatives such as open architecture (OA) 
and competitive contracting (e.g. Fixed Price Initiatives) in supporting ‘Should Cost’ 
based management decisions to improve affordability and capabilities whilst 
preserving adaptive traits in view of evolving military requirements.  
Nomenclature 
iJ : set of coefficients with parameter uncertainty 
, ,j jp y z :  Dual variables of non-linear primal 
   :  decision vector of policies (i) 
piU :  Utility of policy (i) on participant (p) 
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piC :  cost of policy (i) on participant (p) 
,j ju l : Upper and lower variable bounds 
corr rateiR P :  Product of correlation matrix and ‘performance due to policy (i)’ 
 : level of conservatism 
  :  weighting factor 
   : baseline capability level for each of the capabilities that 
contribute to index 
,
B
q tC  : cost of acquiring system (q) at time (t) 
S
tC  : cost of retiring system (q) at time (t) 
,
B
q tX  : Decision vector 
,
B
q tU  and ,
B
q tV : decision to acquire and remove system (q) at time (t) 
ik :  Independent and symmetric random variable 
Sqc: Numerical value for system (q) capability type (c) 
q:  system 
Abbreviation 
DoD:   Department of Defense 
OA:   Open Architecture 
VCG:   Vickerey-Clark-Groves 
P2P:   Peer to Peer 
SoS:   System of Systems 
LCS:   Littoral Combat Ship 
LP:   Linear Program 
MISDP:  mixed integer semi definite programming 
MIW:   Mine Warfare 
ASW:   Anti-Submarine Warfare 
SUW:   Surface Warfare 
MCM:  Mine Counter Measures  
Outreach and Collaboration 
Work documented in this report has resulted in a conference publication at 
the 10th NPS Acquisition Research Symposium 2013, the IEEE Conference on 
System of Systems and the 11th NPS Acquisition Research Symposium 2014. 
Resulting interactions at attended conferences have produced very valuable insights 
into the applicability of method(s) developed towards defense acquisitions research. 
The presentation and interactions at the IEEE System of Systems Engineering 
(SoSE) conference has resulted in feedback and additional input on the merits of our 
current results and potential further development of the portfolio approach in this 
report. The presentation of research material at the conference especially allowed us 
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to foster closer academic ties and exchanges with various members of the broader 
community for collaboration and exchange of ideas. The work has also informed and 
enhanced related work we are conducting under the DoD SERC UARC in the area 
of analytic methods for system of systems planning and evolution. 
Introduction  
Our research seeks to introduce innovations formed at the intersection of 
system-of-system engineering, operations research and financial engineering 
towards dealing with technical and programmatic complexities of managing 
acquisition and development of a portfolio of defense capabilities. More specifically, 
our work seeks to extend prior funded NPS efforts (ref) in the application of portfolio-
based approaches to managing cost, schedule and risk, by considering policy and 
multi-epoch decision impacts within a quantitative framework. The quantitative 
frameworks we present do not seek to replace decision-maker authority, but rather, 
complement him/her with tools that offer quantitatively based insights of the complex 
acquisition trade-space for more informed decision-making. Effectively, the idea is to 
reduce decision-making difficulties, by allowing mathematical programming to 
account for the combinatorial and uncertainty aspects of the problem, whilst 
delegating the decision-making and trade-space control to that of the human 
decision-maker. We accomplish this through a portfolio-based technique in dealing 
with programmatic acquisition complexities. In this body of work, we adopt 
mathematical programming techniques to deal with issues in 1) policy construction 
for cost and schedule overruns using mechanism design 2) a strategic level robust 
multi-period portfolio problem and 3) a multi-period portfolio formulation that 
leverages decision epoch updates for sequential decision-making. Concept 
application problems illustrate the aforementioned methods that address facets of 
the complex decision-making associated with multi-period decision epochs. 
Motivation 
The US Department of Defense (DoD) has emphasized a need for Better 
Buying Power (BBP) initiatives in tackling issues of increasing costs, schedule 
growths and programmatic failures. Dr. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics, in a series of memo issues (ref), has 
called for a need for ‘Should Cost’ policies to promote affordability in defense 
acquisitions. ‘Should Cost’ policies involve a practical approach to reducing costs of 
defense portfolios through targeting of cost growths, incentivizing productivity and 
innovation, reducing redundant processes, promotion of real competition and 
improvement of tradecraft in acquisition of services. The spirit of the move towards 
affordability is to promote the identification and acquisition of sensible technologies 
(or programs) at an acceptable cost and at minimum schedule risk. Policy levers 
(e.g. incentivized contracting) are used to promote innovation, while at the same 
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time, reducing cost growths and redundancies in the capabilities of the warfighter 
portfolio. The reduction in technical and programmatic redundancies is in line with 
the US military’s vision of promoting adaptability and resilience in capabilities where 
systems and assets can adapt, through reconnections and redeployment of existing 
assets, towards meeting the needs of a changing warfighter scenario.  
 Additionally, there have been significant efforts in promoting competitive 
innovation through Open Architecture (OA) and rapid prototyping initiatives. OA 
establishes set standards that enable the leveraging of technological innovations, 
with emphasis on Small Business Innovation research (SBIR) and Small Business 
Technology Transfer (STTR) mechanisms that can readily interface with existing 
platforms, based on set interface standards. More specifically, OA involves the 
design and implementation of systems that conform to a common and unified set of 
technical interfaces and business standards. This form of ‘open architecture’ tests 
and broadens potential innovations to a much larger scope than traditional 
acquisition processes. Rapid prototyping on the other hand complements efforts 
such as the OA to enable rapid proof-of-concept testing and fielding in warfighter 
test environments. Rapid prototyping and testing of new, yet-to-be introduced 
systems naturally provides objective information on the potential operational value of 
individual systems early on in the platform lifecycle.   
The current needs of the US military still challenges the effectiveness of BBP 
policies in acquiring ‘capabilities’ rather than localized acquisition of an individual 
system. The acquisition of ‘capabilities’, in an overarching sense, presents unique 
complexities that exist between yet-to-be acquired and existing system capabilities.  
BBP policies, OA and rapid prototyping are examples of policies that serve to 
determine the value of yet-to-be introduced systems. However, these policies are 
more of general guidelines and cannot deal with the technical and programmatic 
complexities of the overarching collection of systems or ‘system of systems’ as a 
whole that contribute collectively to a desired capability.  Furthermore, the decision-
spaces associated with evaluating the connectivity, capabilities and development 
schedule impacts under uncertainty, can involve a large number of variables that 
can often go beyond the immediate mental faculties of the decision-maker. The 
problem in size of the decision space exacerbates the difficulty of decision-making in 
situations where early on acquisition decisions can have an impact on subsequent 
decision-epochs of an acquisition strategy. The current guidelines in the Department 
of Defense (DoD Acquisitions Guidebook (DAG), and the DoD System of Systems 
Engineering (SoSE) Guidebook do not provide distinct methodologies in managing 
the quantitative complexities that can manifest across technical and programmatic 
dimensions of development. The need for necessary quantitative tools and 
frameworks towards supporting effective decision-making across measures of cost, 
risk and schedule for defense acquisitions, motivates our body of research. 
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Acquisition Management for Systems-of-
Systems:  Affordability through Effective 
Portfolio Management 
Methods of Approach 
This section covers the three methods of approach that we have investigated 
towards dealing with issues in 1) policy construction for cost and schedule overruns 
using mechanism design 2) a strategic level robust multi-period portfolio problem 
and 3) a multi-period portfolio formulation that leverages decision epoch updates for 
sequential decision-making. 
Method 1: A Mechanism Design Approach to Policy 
Design 
This thrust of our research examines mechanism design of auctions for 
modeling behaviors and effecting policy interventions that are intended to improve 
overall programmatic performance when acquiring independently managed systems 
of systems. Previous models and empirical studies provide an understanding of the 
behavioral aspects of the acquisition process. A method inspired by mechanism 
design incorporates the insights and data from these studies to formulate a 
probabilistic optimization framework for constructing interventions that enhance the 
probability of meeting cost and schedule goals when acquiring a system of systems. 
The method follows a myopic policy in multi-epoch decision-making and can be 
utilized at each strategic epoch of acquisition process with the goal of reducing cost 
and schedule overruns. 
Overview of Acquisition Models and Studies and Mechanism 
Design 
Models of the system of systems acquisition process provide a structure for 
investigating the impact of interventions that incentivize the managers of the 
systems that comprise a system of systems to change their behavior. Empirical 
studies of the acquisition process identify the key behavioral aspects of the 
acquisition process and analysis of its empirical data can yield estimates of 
quantitative relationships between behaviors and their effects on programmatic 
measures such as cost and schedule. Mechanism design methods can be used to 
formulate a probabilistic optimization framework for evaluating the effects of 
interventions that enhance the probability of meeting cost and schedule goals when 
acquiring a system of systems. 
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Models and Studies of the Acquisition Process  
The trapeze model (Dahmann J. e., 2011)for system of systems  describes 
seven interacting core elements, or activities, that accomplish systems engineering 
for systems of systems. The wave model  unwinds the trapeze model to define an 
iterative, dynamic model that accomplishes the goals of the seven elements in the 
trapeze model by employing six steps: initiation, initial analysis, architecting, 
planning, implementation, and continuing analysis. The last four steps can be 
repeated indefinitely as the system of systems evolves in response to changes in the 
external environment and the results of the managerial and operational behaviors 
exhibited by the participating systems. In this research, acquisition cost and 
schedule are the key measures of the results of managerial behavior; and technical 
performance capability is the key measure of the results of operational behavior. 
The six activities of the wave model have been used to define an agent-based 
model of system of systems development (Acheson, et al., 2012). The model 
simulates iteration of designing, planning, implementation, and continuing analysis. 
The agent-based wave model defines the set of prerequisite activities that must be 
completed prior to advancing the epoch and beginning a new iteration of an activity. 
The agent-based model uses a genetic algorithm to simulate generation of initial 
system of systems architectures, and it uses a fuzzy assessor model to simulate 
selection of the desired system of systems architecture for the next epoch based on 
four attributes associated with each system: performance, affordability, robustness, 
and flexibility. Each system communicates if it is going to participate in the next 
epoch based on its ability and willingness to cooperate. 
Wirthlin (Wirthlin, 2009) used empirical data to model the US defense 
acquisition system as three interdependent processes: budgeting (how much and 
when to buy), requirements development (why and what to buy), and acquisition 
(how to buy). He defined five key characteristics of the acquisition system: cost, 
schedule, quality, transparency, and flexibility. He concluded that flexibility, 
transparency, and quality are the most valued and are essentially non-negotiable, 
whereas cost and schedule are negotiable. He describes the behaviors and results 
that occur from valuing these three characteristics as follows: 
If flexibility is valued, e.g. being able to start programs at will, rush 
things through, jump ahead of other programs in development cycle, 
then the system must be able to deal with the funding instability that 
ensues. If transparency is valued, e.g. process checking, error 
proofing, consensus-building, then the system must maintain process 
reviews and levels of approval and accept expensive use of calendar 
time. If quality is valued, e.g. not giving relief for technical 
requirements, capabilities and performance expectations, then expect 
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program delays and cost increases to develop and mature the 
necessary technologies, or deliver the expected capabilities, etc. 
There is empirical data from other studies that support the assertion that cost and 
schedule should be considered as negotiable, dependent variables (Oehmen, 
Olechowski, Kenley, & Ben-Dayac, 2012), (Conrow, 1997). 
Using a survey instrument, Sheard (Sheard, 2012) confirmed a hypothesis 
regarding three measures of complexity for system development efforts: “Projects 
characterized by higher numbers of ‘difficult’ requirements, higher cognitive 
overload, and more complex stakeholder relationships demonstrate significantly 
higher performance issues (cost overrun, schedule delay, and performance 
shortfall).” Difficult requirements are considered to be difficult to implement or 
engineer, are hard to trace to the source, and have a high degree of overlap with 
other requirements. Higher cognitive overload exists when the project frequently 
finds itself in a fog of conflicting data and information overload combined with 
multitasking and interruptions. Complexity in stakeholder relationships is measured 
according to an ordinal scale as follows: (1) relationships stable; (2) new 
relationships; and (3) resistance to changing relationships.   
To gain an understanding of the causes of failure in acquisition programs in 
the US Air Force, Marticello (Martcello, Jr., 2012) applied the conceptual framework 
that complexity emerges from two elements, the diversity of things to be done and 
the coordination required to get them done (Tainter, 1988). Marticello reviewed three 
areas that provide evidence of complexity in the Air Force acquisition system: 
significant differentiation that exists in personnel specialization and organizational 
structure, the large number of actions required to manage financial resources, and 
the need to comply with a large number of regulatory guidelines and policies.  
McNew (McNew, 2011) used behavior archetypes to structure a survey on 
the prevalence of certain behaviors in acquisition and their relationship to cost or 
schedule growth and to root causes of the behaviors. McNew surveyed 65 program 
managers who were asked to confirm the presence or absence of the behaviors on 
specific programs. If a behavior was present, the respondents indicated if the 
behavior was a cause of cost or schedule growth, and the root causes that 
contributed to the presence of the behavior. Error! Reference source not found. 
shows the influence diagram for the survey, which indicates the probabilities that can 
be estimated directly from the survey results, P{Behavior}, P{Management Outcome 
| Behavior}, and P{Root Cause | Behavior}. By applying Bayes’ rule to these 
estimates, P{Management Outcome | Root Cause} and P{Root Cause} can be 
determined.  
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Figure 1. Behavior Archetypes Influence Diagram    
Table 1 shows summary statistics from using McNew’s survey data in order of 
the estimate prevalence (P) of the root causes. The very high correlation between 
schedule growth and cost growth are typical and explained by the fact that the 
majority of the cost incurred in most projects is for salaries of personnel who remain 
on the project until it is completed. The correlations between the root causes and the 
cost and schedule outcomes represent the “dose-response” relationship that 
measures the effect that a change in the probability of occurrence of a root cause 
can have on the probability of occurrence of an cost and schedule outcomes. Our 
mechanism design framework uses the Bayesian network to capture the correlations 
and the estimated probabilities based on the survey as inputs to specify the baseline 
dose-response behavior for individual systems within a system of systems. The 
mechanism design aims to optimize the effect on outcomes that result from 
changing P{Root Cause} via policy changes or other interventions. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for McNew Survey 
 Correlation  
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 SG CG P 
R1 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.4 
R2 
 
1.0 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 
R3 
  
1.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.3 
R4 
   
1.0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 
R5 
    
1.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 
SG 
     
1.0 0.8 0.6 
CG 
      
1.0 0.6 
Mechanism Design 
Mechanism design, also known as ‘reverse game theory’, refers to the 
construction of governing rules of interaction among participating agents, to result in 
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a desired global outcome. The fundamentals of mechanism design derive from 
game theory and typically aim at motivating agents to disclose truthful private 
information, while seeking to maximize their respective utilities. An intuitive example 
is the case of auctions where the implementation of specific auction rules, can be 
theoretically shown (under certain assumptions) to result in optimal utility for 
participating agents, only if the agents disclose truthful valuations of the items being 
auctioned. One such auctioning mechanism is the Vickerey-Clark-Groves (VCG) 
mechanism (Vickrey, 1061) (Clarke, 1971) (Groves, 1973), that considers the 
optimal design of an auction for a single item case where bidders have unlimited 
budgets. The method is based on the idea that there are observed, common 
knowledge distributions on prior valuations by each bidder. The main properties that 
drive the design of auctions are related to knowledge and assumptions on bidder 
budgets and include the following conditions (Bandi, Tractable stochastic analysis in 
high dimensions via robust optimization , 2012): 
1. Individual Rationality: Buyers do not achieve negative utility with 
truthful bids. 
2. Budget Feasibility: Buyers are constrained by resource budgets in 
bidding. 
3. Incentive Compatibility: Bidders fare best (optimal utility) when 
truthfully disclosing information. 
In general, the conditions listed in (a-c) above are not all achievable in auctions. For 
example, Dobzinski (Dobzinski, 2008) proves the impossibility of an incentive-
compatible auction that is always Pareto-optimal, in the case of a multi-unit auction 
with private information budget limits.  
Computational mechanism design is the application of mechanism design 
principles to the case of computer agents that act on the behalf of human 
counterparts. In lieu of controlling interactions on large-scale systems, (e.g. the 
internet, P2P, e-commerce, bandwidth allocation), computational mechanism design 
provides a powerful, game-theoretic framework for the control and administration of 
multi-agent systems within a decentralized framework (Dash, 2003). There have 
been many practical applications of mechanism design that include, tactical sensor 
allocation (Klein, 2008), electricity markets, and even Google’s advertising revenue 
management systems (Edeleman, 2005). 
The myriad of interactive conditions that exist in current real world systems 
have prompted the development of a range of theoretical and algorithmic work that 
address varied assumptions and conditions for auction mechanisms. Recent 
research has adopted robust optimization methods to design a multi-item multi-
bidder auction under budget constraints; the core tenet of the work replaces 
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Kolmogorov axioms of probability with the notion of uncertainty sets that derive from 
asymptotic implications of probability theory (Bandi, 2012). This robust formulation 
allows for a numerically tractable approach for large-scale auction design that leads 
to improved revenue generation for the auctioneer, even under conditions of 
uncertainty in valuations and past distributions. 
Mechanism Design for Acquisitions  
In a system of systems, the interacting operationally and managerially 
independent entities gives rise to complex dynamics that can either benefit 
architectural evolution or, conversely, generate systemic failures. The selection of an 
appropriate set of interaction rules (policies) for participating agents that interact in 
the system of systems acquisition process is naturally important in ensuring that key 
performance goals of the overarching architectural gamut are fulfilled while 
preserving preferences on maximizing individual agent utilities and reflect the utility 
seeking behaviors of entities in a system of systems. Mechanism design strategies 
can potentially be useful in the construction of incentive-compatible policies that 
establish the potential for individual agents to maximize utility under budget 
constraints. Figure 2 shows the general feedback loop for sequential policy-making 
epochs. 
 
Figure 2. Policy mechanism feedback for system of systems acquisitions. 
Figure 2 is adapted from the wave model (Dahmann, Rebovich, Lane, Lowry, 
& Baldwin, 2011) and illustrates the mechanistic feedback process where 
information gains at the end of each decision epoch (e.g. through the McNew data at 
the post ‘implement and integrate’ phase) are used to perform acquisition policy 
changes that support conducive participant behaviors in minimizing contributors of 
cost and schedule overruns. The combination of a Bayesian Network approach in 
estimating the effects of propagation, and optimization driven decision-making 
(under uncertainty) can be a valuable tool in orchestrating a feedback control that 
identifies optimal policy vectors. In effect, the decisions set the stage for a sequential 
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‘auction’ between the organizations responsible for the system of systems and 
participating agencies. The consideration of the policy vector as binary choices 
allows for the quantitative aspects of the problem to be addressed within the context 
of a discrete optimization problem.  
Optimization Problem Formulation and Solution  
We motivate our mechanism design approach with a conceptual problem that 
seeks to determine the optimal set of discrete policies that minimizes the effects 
(probabilities) of cost and schedule related root causes occurring within a system of 
systems acquisitions context. The treatment of policies as discrete actions (such as 
the reward system for acquisition program office personnel and the contracting 
terms with system developers) allows for a large variety of types of policies to be 
considered. The idea is to use a priori information, such as that garnered from the 
McNew survey data in this research, to reduce cost and schedule growth through 
effective policy management. We adopt an operations research perspective to 
dealing with optimal selection of policies, and seek to maximize the performance 
(minimize cost and schedule growth) of an overarching system of systems 
acquisition.  
The approach is based on extension of a relatively simple combinatorial 
auction problem where the objective of the auctioneer is to maximize revenue 
subject to receiving a set of bids for auctioned items ( (Tutuncu, Combinatorial 
Auctions, 2007)). This parallels, in a simple sense, the dynamics of acquisition 
interactions where the policies for acquisitions (‘items of auction’) result in a net 
performance (root cause manifestations (‘bids’) from participants of the auction, 
namely the systems that are participating in a system of systems acquisition. The 
idea is thus to dynamically adapt and minimize cost and schedule growth, through 
the feedback mechanism as depicted in Figure (2), while considering the 
uncertainties in associated estimated quantities (e.g. P (root causes)). 
The resulting robust optimization problem, following the Bertsimas-Sim 
method of formulation (Bertsimas, 2004), becomes the following: 
max  t       (1) 
subject to: 
i
corr ratei i j
j J
R P x z p t

           (2) 
y         j corr rate j j iz p R P y j J         (3) 
   j j j j iy x y y j J           (4) 
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       j j j j il x u y j J        (5) 
0, 0, 0j jp y z         (6) 
1 5 1x x        (7) 
2 6 1x x        (8) 
  0pi pi iU C x       (9) 
pi i p
i
C x Budget       (10) 
[0,1]ix   (policy vector)    (11) 
where:  
iJ :  set of coefficients with parameter uncertainty 
, ,j jp y z : dual variables of non-linear primal  
(see reference (Bertsimas, 2004)) 
xi :  decision vector of policies (i) 
piU :  utility of policy (i) on participant (p) 
piC :  cost of policy (i) on participant (p) 
,j ju l :  upper and lower variable bounds  
corr rateiR P :  product of correlation matrix and ‘performance due to 
policy (i)’ 
 :  level of conservatism 
Equations (1-3), represent the robustified objective of maximizing 
performance, that is quantified by corr ratei iR P x . ; The first two terms, corrR and rateiP , 
relate to the estimated effect that the decision to introduce policies xi will have in 
reducing the probabilities of root causes occurring (R1-R5) as described in Figure 1. 
We assume an estimation uncertainty that exists in the coefficients of the matrix 
product of corr rateR P , and assume it to exist in the nominal interval of [ corr rateR P + corr rateR P ,
corr rateR P - corr rateR P ].  The robust formulation that uses the Bertsimas-Sim approach 
ensures that is able to withstand the coefficient uncertainties with probabilistic 
guarantees based on a chosen level of conservatism. Equations (2 - 6) employ the 
use dual variables from the original non-linear formulation (see reference 
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(Bertsimas, 2004)) variables in the robustification of the resulting optimization 
problem. Equations (7 and 8) enforce compatibility constraints for policies. In this 
case, policies 1 and 5, and, 2 and 6 are mutually exclusive. Equation (9) ensures 
that the policies selected result in a net utility for each stakeholding participant entity 
in the system of systems architecture. The cost and utility to participant p, Upi, and 
Cpi, due to the implementation of policy xi are estimated quantities that can reflect, 
say, monetary valuations of policy decisions. Equation (10) ensures budget 
feasibility of the policy for participating agents. While Equations (9) and (10) address 
the requirements of budget feasibility and individual rationalities in a very simplistic 
sense, this may not always be achievable due to the nature of the set policies 
available. For example, the implementation of any combination of a finite set of 
policies may favor specific groups of system development programs more than 
others and present negative net utilities; this condition may require relaxations to be 
enforced and a consideration of utility frontiers that address tradeoffs between 
participating agents. Equation (11) describes the decision variables as binary 
integers; the linear formulation of the optimization problem, with these binary 
variables makes it a binary integer-programming problem. Although the formulation 
is built on a myopic policy, we partially address the multi-period nature of the 
acquisition feedback loop as shown in Figure (2) by considering the uncertainties of 
each decision epoch. 
Results for Mechanism Design Policy Generation 
We solve the optimization problem of Equations (1 – 11) using values of  , 
varied between 0.1 and 2.5; this allows for the construction of a trade-off frontier 
between performance and conservatism (probability of constraint violation), as 
shown in Figure (3) and Figure (4) respectively. Although there are 25 discrete 
optimization runs, there are however, only three unique ‘portfolios’ of policies    as 
presented in Table 2. These correspond to the circled points in Figures (3) and (4), 
at prescribed levels of conservatism,  . The discrete nature of the decision variables 
allows for a fixed vector of policies (   ) to range of probabilities until the next 
‘optimal’ configuration of policies; the probabilities of constraint violations are thus 
lower bounds for each discovered optimal solution.  
While the natural instinct would be to assume policies with the lowest 
probabilities of constraint violation, the associated tradeoff with performance and 
cost, (among other potential metrics) in performing the policies, may offset the 
potential gains. The ‘cost-benefit’ analysis on the range of optimal policies can be 
performed by the policymaker to determine a suitable policy vector that attempts to 
minimize the probability of root causes that directly contribute to overall cost and 
growth overruns. The robust approach adopted in this section is an initial step 
towards construction of a probabilistic optimization framework that can assist in the 
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construction of appropriate policies, over decision epochs of the system of systems 
acquisitions problem, but can be used as a policy control tool over each period of 
policy decision-making. 
 
Figure 3. Tradeoff between objective and conservatism in robustness. Γ is 
the adjustable conservatism constant. 
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Figure 4. Probability of constraint violation at varying levels of constraint 
conservatism Γ.  
Table 2. Policy selection based on conservatism 
 Unique Portfolios 
Policy 1 1 - - 
Policy 2 1 1 - 
Policy 3 1 1 1 
Policy 4 1 - - 
Policy 5 - 1 1 
Policy 6 - - 1 
Policy 7 1 1 1 
Policy 8 1 1 1 
Conservatism ( ) 0.1 0.3 0.9 
P(Constraint Viol) 0.64 0.61 0.52 
    
Our work in mechanism design presents an initial framework for constructing 
approach to applying mechanism design to system of systems acquisition 
management. It can be used to extend the  agent-based model of system of systems 
development (Acheson, et al., 2012) to allow for evaluating the impact of 
interventions that change the behavior of the managers of the participating (and non-
participating) systems. Additional surveys may provide further insights and empirical 
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data to enhance the applicability and realism of the agent-based model. 
Furthermore, extensions to the optimization framework will include more explicit 
integration of Bayesian measures in the optimization process, to promote an optimal 
balance of performance maximization and policy information gain using available 
methods from literature (Ryzhov, 2012) 
Method 2: A Robust Multi-Period Decision 
Framework 
Portfolio management techniques have been successfully applied to the 
management of strategic ‘portfolios of systems’ in military acquisitions; this includes 
application of Real Options (RO) theory and metrics such as Knowledge-Value 
Added (KVA) that account for the value added by human and IT investments 
(Komoroski, 2006). Work by Mun (2005) (Mun, 2005)has developed an eight phase 
process to addressing portfolio management of strategic assets. Work by Giachetti 
(2012) (Giachetti, 2012)has applied stochastic techniques to managing military 
investments. Previously funded research by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 
presented at the 2012 NPS Acquisition Research Symposium (Davendralingam, 
2012), has focused on a robust portfolio management problem of maximizing a 
warfighter system of systems portfolio performance index while preserving 
budgetary and compatibility constraints of underlying military assets.  
Risks and capabilities associated with system interdependencies can span 
the functional or physical spaces of the system of systems construct and is subject 
to uncertainty. The developed strategy supports acquisitions, both in the pre- and 
post- milestone B phases, and considers current initiatives such as open 
architecture (OA) and competitive contracting (e.g. Fixed Price Initiatives) in 
improving affordability and BBP objectives while considering evolving military 
requirements. Work in this research extends the robust portfolio approach to include 
a multi-period portfolio perspective.   
The multi-period portfolio optimization approach draws upon a rich history of 
algorithmic development, as noted in operations research related literature (Powell 
(2011), Bertsimas (2008), Bertsekas (2005), (Fabozzi, 2007), (Tutuncu, 2007) . Its 
roots stem from sequential decision making areas known broadly as dynamic 
programming or stochastic programming and adapts control theory methodologies to 
the dynamic management of resources in the interest of maximizing (or minimizing) 
some given metric. Stochastic programming focuses on issues of uncertainty 
whereas dynamic programming relates to the optimality of making sequential 
decisions; however, there has been a large degree of overlap and exchange 
between the two areas. Algorithmic development in these areas have been applied 
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to a range of real-world dynamic decision making problems that range from financial 
portfolio management to real-time control of vehicles.  
The robust multi-period portfolio framework allows for mathematical rigor of 
algorithmic techniques (transparent to the end user/practitioner), to support SoS 
level acquisition decisions through identification of optimal ‘portfolios’ of systems to 
be acquired in pursuit of desired SoS capabilities. While the acquisition process 
spans operationally and managerially independent defense groups, the tools and 
frameworks envisioned to support these aspects aim to provide adequate trade-
space exploration capabilities and extend the prior section’s mechanism design 
based framework to include combinatorial effects of different systems that can be 
put together towards achieving a military capability. These explorations require a 
domain agnostic framework, and hence intuitively resonate with the idea of treating 
the collection of systems across domains as a ‘portfolio’ of systems in the SoS. 
The concept naval warfare scenario in this section demonstrates the 
application of the multi-period portfolio framework in managing the sequential 
acquisitions needed to propagate required capabilities whilst minimizing operational 
and developmental risks. The method illustrates the identification of optimal 
evolution of interconnected systems that cohesively function in providing an 
overarching SoS wide capability. A robust optimization approach to the multi-period 
portfolio formulation addresses issues of data uncertainty. 
Portfolio Systems Modelling 
The acquisition (and removal) of systems in an evolving a system of systems 
inherently involves a timeline of sequentially executed decisions.  Decisions made at 
each epoch affects the decision options of future states, thus affecting long-term 
performance and risks of the system of systems. The translation of these sequential 
decisions to the context of a multi-period investment model requires an adequate 
description of node (system) attributes; this ensures the selection of feasible 
portfolios that satisfy nodal requirements and minimize cascading risks. Figure 5 
shows generic behaviors for considered systems in a system of systems portfolio. 
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Figure 5. Archetypal node (system) behaviors 
In Figure 5, the capabilities of an existing system of systems (initial blue nodes), 
have the potential to evolve, based on potential connections to yet-to-be acquired 
systems (dashed lines and nodes). At each decision epoch, the practitioner utilizes a 
decision-making framework (such as the multi-period portfolio framework) to 
evaluate the value and risks involved in the potential acquisitions of new systems 
(denoted by red dashed lines). The resulting new collection of systems that comprise 
the new SoS construct, now include the addition of the new systems. 
A system of systems is treated as a set of generic discrete nodes with the 
following attributes: 
 Capability (Outputs): Nodes have finite supply of capabilities that are 
limited by quantity (e.g. total power output of generator systems). 
 Requirements (Inputs): Nodes have individual requirements. 
Requirements are fulfilled by receiving capabilities from other nodes 
that can fulfill said set of requirements (e.g. a high powered AMDS 
radar requirement of energy can be fulfilled by multiple generators)  
 Compatibility: Nodes can only connect to other nodes based on a pre–
established set of rule (e.g. AMDS radar can only accept power from 
high capacity nuclear reactor systems on specific ships). 
Multi-Period Investment Portfolio Formulation 
The problem statement for a multi-period investment portfolio is translated to 
the language of mathematical programming. The process begins with the definition 
of two main elements of a mathematical program, namely, the objective function and 
constraints. The objective function is a mathematical expression that is formulated to 
reflect a key performance metric of the system to be maximized (or minimized). 
Typical formulations of the objective function seek, for example, to minimize direct 
costs of operating a fleet of aircraft. For a system of systems, the objective function 
reflects a chosen measure of performance and/or associated costs. The second 
important aspect of a mathematical program is the formulation of the constraints. 
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The constraints reflect physical, resource and behavioral aspects of the systems as 
mathematical expressions. Our initial framework for a multi-period portfolio considers 
a long term horizon of acquisitions with discrete decision steps that denote periods 
of ‘investment’; these investments involve the addition/removal of individual systems 
that comprise the overall system of systems network.  
The following mathematical program describes a preliminary framework for 










    
  
     (12) 
subject to: 
, , 1 , ,
B B B B
q t q t q t q tX X U V        (13) 
, ,
trans B B S S









       (15) 
, ,  (Satisfy Requirements at each t)
B B
qtC q t qtR q t
q q
S X S X     (16) 
 , , ,
,
..   j=1...k (Package System Compatibility)B Bi t n t j t
j t
X X M      (17) 
, , 1 , ,, , , [0,1]
B B B B
q t q t q t q tX X U V    t=0… T (time-steps) (18) 
where: 
w  - weighting factor vector that weights the importance of constituent 
capabilities of index 
Rc  - baseline capability level for each of the capabilities that contribute to index 
,
B
q tC   - cost of acquiring system (q) at time (t) 
S
tC   - cost of retiring system (q) at time (t) 
Equation (12) is the weighted objective function that seeks to maximize the 
end-developed system of system performance index. Here, the index is related to 
the final state of the portfolio (t=T) and is weighted according to the value that each 
capability (C) contributes to the index (however, this can naturally reflect 
maximization of each stage, if necessary). The index is normalized by referencing it 
to some chosen reference capability set (Rc). Equation (13) reflects the evolutionary 
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nature of the portfolio of chosen systems (q) at time (t), represented by the decision 
vector ,
B
q tX . Here, the decision vector is binary, to reflect discrete system choices; 
however, a more general setting can allow the variables to be continuous in nature.   
The terms  ,
B
q tU  and ,
B
q tV  reflect decisions to ‘acquire’ and ‘remove/retire’ 
individual systems respectively, in the portfolio of systems at each decision epoch of 
time (t). Equation (14) captures the ‘transactional’ costs at each stage; this means 
that decisions to acquire/remove systems translate to costs associated with each 
that are accrued at each time step. In acquisitions, the removal cost translates to a 
salvage/swap cost for changing out individual systems whereas the ‘acquire’ cost is 
simply the cost of purchasing and integrating a new system. Equation (15) ensures 
budgetary balance for total costs (transactional and acquisition) that occur.  
Equation (16) ensures that the total ‘capabilities’ from systems acquired, 
satisfy the requirements that individual systems may have; for example, there must 
be adequate power generating systems selected to support selected 
communications systems that provide some system wide communications capability. 
Conditions for Equation (16) can be enforced at each time step (t) or at the final 
stage (t=T), depending on requirements at each time step. Equation (17) enforces 
compatibility constraints as binary conditions for a total of (k) set of rules; for 
example, the constraint that only one engine can be selected to generate power 
would translate to a constraint of x1 + x2 = 1 where (x1,x2) are binary variables. The 
rules can be applied across decision epochs, reflecting the need to have prior 
systems in existence, before particular upgrades can be implemented in future time 
steps. Equation (18) states that the decision variables are binary and that the time 
window consists of discrete steps from t=0 to a final time t=T. The problem 
formulation of Equations (12-18) constitutes a binary integer program, for which 
efficient methods of solution and commercial solvers are available. 
Robust Multi-Period Investment Portfolio 
The multi-period formulation of Equations (12-18) are deterministic and do not 
consider uncertainties in the data. Real world systems are inherently driven by 
uncertainty and thus challenge the optimality (and feasibility) of decisions made 
under deterministic assumptions. Research in mathematical programming has 
progressively focused more on the development of robust optimization methods to 
deal with manifestations of uncertainty. Robust optimization seeks to find solutions, 
to uncertain mathematical programming problems, that are less sensitive to 
parametric variations in the problem being solved. We consider uncertainties in the 
data for Equations (12-18), namely in the ‘transaction costs’ of Equations (14-15) 
that reflect system addition and removal costs. We also consider uncertainties in the 
capabilities of each system available. 
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The consideration of the uncertainty in the multi-period formulation requires 
the use of robust optimization methods for solution. There are a range of methods 
that can address the uncertain linear structure of the resulting optimization problem; 
however, we adopt the Bertsimas-Sim (correlated case) approach for our preliminary 
multi-period framework. The Bertsimas-Sim method (Bertsimas, 2004) is a robust 
optimization approach to solving linear optimization problems with uncertain data. 
The method allows for a flexible adjustment in the level of conservatism of the robust 
solutions (termed the Price of Robustness) in terms of probabilistic bounds of 
constraint violations.  
We consider the following is a general uncertain linear program (LP): 
maximize         Tc x       (19) 
subject to: 
Ax b       (20) 
0x          (21) 
Where values aij of matrix A are uncertain and exist in the nominally symmetric 
bounds of [aij- aij, aij+ aij]. The uncertainties are treated as constraint-wise 
uncertainties. In the correlated case, the uncertainties are modelled as the following 
equation: 
i





      (22) 
where ik are the independent and symmetric random variables [-1, 1], and there are 
k number of uncertain sources. The robust optimization problem to the correlated 
case can be written as the following linear optimization problem (Bertsimas, 2004): 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 18 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 




ij j i i ij i
j j J
x z p b

         (24) 
i ij jz p y        (25) 
i
j kj j j
j J
y g x y

        (26) 
j j jl x y       (27) 
, , 0ij ij ijp y z       (28) 
where pij yij, zij are the dual variables associated with the dual problem of the 
nonlinear formulation of the Bertsimas-Sim method (See (Bertsimas, 2004) for full 
derivation), and J is the set of uncertain coefficients. The conservatism term, Γi, is 
adjusted to control probabilistic guarantees of constraint (i) violation. For example, 
changing Γ, for linear constraints that dictates power distribution flow over a network, 
controls the probability of net power being supplied at a prescribed level of cost. The 
constraint violation probability bounds for individual constraints can be approximated 
using the following De-Moivre approximation of the binomial distribution (Bertsimas, 
2004): 
1
( , ) 1   iiB n
n
  
   
 
       (29) 
where n is the |Ji| and Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function. The 
manipulation of Γ in controlling the probability of constraint violation, allows for an 
intuitive interpretation of the conservatism of solutions generated, and permits 
practitioners the means of assessing solution performances against associated risk 
in terms of individual constraint violations.  
Robustification: Bertsimas-Sim (Correlated) Approach  
The robust (correlated) implementation of the Bertsimas-Sim approach in 
Equations (22-28) is applied to the multi-period model of Equations (12-18).  The 
following equations described the robustified budget constraints for the multi-period 
model, in particular context of budget feasibility, expressed earlier in Equation (15): 
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where 
jx is the concatenated decision vector { ,
B
q t TX  , 0,1,2
B
q tV  } associated with all 
transactions (t=0,1, 2). 
Interpretation of risk 
The inclusion of correlation information reflects an important contribution 
where protection levels of each robust constraint, in the non-correlated case 
assumes the simultaneous worst-case scenarios at the uncertainty bounds – a 
condition that is highly improbable. The correlated case accounts for the 
simultaneous ‘movements’ in performance and/or risks across the capabilities of 
individual assets.  Prior research has utilized a mixed integer semidefinite 
programming (MISDP) approach to dealing with uncertainties in the covariance 
matrix, a matrix that is associated with variances (risk) in system development time. 
However, there are very limited solvers that are able to solve MISDPs, which limits 
practical implementation, despite some of the computational advantages in dealing 
with uncertainty. 
Concept Application: Naval Acquisition Scenario 
The Naval Acquisition Scenario is based on the Littoral Combat Ship (The 
USA’s new Littoral Combat Ships, 2011) model. The LCS (Figure 6) is a naval 
combat vessel, developed by Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, because of 
the Navy’s dual contracting efforts to reduce cost through competition. The design of 
these ships seeks to provide a more agile and cost effective solution to various near 
shore environment missions. These missions are executed through use of 
interchangeable ship packages that include Mine Warfare (MIW), Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW) and Surface Warfare (SUW). The highly modular design of the 
platform, allows for a great degree of operational flexibility. The modularity also 
translates to the ability for open architecture and small business initiatives to be 
brought to bear in reducing program costs and improving competition. Work in this 
research assumes an LCS inspired scenario as  representative ‘simple’ SoS model 
where the objective is to identify potential sequence of investment decisions and the 
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corresponding end collection of systems that can best maximize core capabilities of 
the SoS mission (in this case, MIW,ASW, SUW).  
Our simplified model consists of a hypothetical list of candidate systems, 
listed in Table 3, that are available to the Navy for acquisition.  Although the number 
presented in the table are fictitious, the salient features of capability, requirements, 
cost and uncertainty are nevertheless represented. Each subset of systems (listed 
by categories of ASW, MCM, SUW, Seaframe, Comm), represents a subset 
collection of systems that are available in meeting the needs of each category. The 
(ASW, MCM, SUW) categories are the core LCS mission packages, ‘Seaframe’ 
reflects the ship seaframe support options and ‘Communications’ represents the 
support communications systems available for deployment. The first five columns 
show capabilities of each system, and their respective numerical valuations. Column 
6 and 7 are the Power and Communications requirement needed for operation of the 
listed systems, in providing the capabilities listed. Also listed are the acquisition 
(buy) and retiring (sell/salvage) costs, along with the estimated uncertainty of each 
cost.  We consider uncertainty in costs for this simplified problem; however, more 
general uncertainty in capabilities and/or requirements can be introduced in the 
same fashion.  
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Figure 6.  (L) concept of operations1 (R) General Dynamics independence 
class LCS 
Table 3. LCS Candidate system scenario 
 
Naval Acquisition Scenario: Results 
We formulate the problem statement for the above LCS inspired acquisition 
problem as a mathematical program that follows the robustified formulation of 
Equations (34-41).  We then solve the resulting mathematical problem using varied 
values of the conservatism parameter,  i, to reflect a range of dynamically evolving 
acquisitions, at each prescribed level of conservatism. Here, we assume 
conservatism in dealing with the costs uncertainties of acquisitions; each chosen 
value of   (here 3 values) in this context thus reflects the probability of budget 
overruns occurring due to the associated costs uncertainties in each stage of 
acquisition. We assume a 3 stage (t=0,1,2) acquisition process, where the systems 
listed in Table 3 can be acquired/retired at each stage, culminating to a final 
‘portfolio’ of assets at the end of stage 3 (t=2).  Acquisition/retirement of these 
systems is subject to a prescribed set of rules that govern their compatibility, and 
availabilities in time (systems only available at specific epochs) as reflected in 
Equation 40 of the problem formulation.  Figure 7 below shows the SoS performance 
frontier tradeoff against degree of conservatism in the budget constraint. 
 
                                            
1
 *Image from: Presentation slides by RDML Vic Guillory of OPNAV at Mine Warfare Association 
Conference (titled “Littoral Combat Ship”, 08-May-07 
Category System Weapon Surface Anti Mine Uncertainty Uncertainty 
Strike Detection Detection Comm Power Power Comm Acquisition Retiring Acquisition Retiring
Range Range Range Bandwith Bandwith Required Required Cost Cost Cost Cost
ASW Variable Depth 0 50 0 0 0 95 100 1.00E+05 1.00E+05 9.84E+01 3.04E+01
Multi Fcn Tow 0 40 0 0 0 90 120 2.00E+05 2.00E+05 1.74E+02 1.83E+02
Lightweight tow 0 30 0 0 0 75 100 3.00E+05 3.00E+05 1.15E+02 2.37E+02
MCM RAMCS II 0 0 10 0 0 70 120 1.00E+05 1.00E+05 7.80E+01 9.05E+00
ALMDS (MH-60) 0 0 20 0 0 90 150 2.00E+05 2.00E+05 1.91E+01 1.33E+02
New Prototype 1 0 0 30 0 0 100 170 3.00E+05 3.00E+05 2.58E+02 1.91E+02
SUW N-LOS Missiles 25 0 0 0 0 0 250 1.00E+05 1.00E+05 3.49E+01 9.19E+01
Griffin Missiles 3 0 0 0 0 0 100 2.00E+05 2.00E+05 1.69E+02 8.05E+01
New Prototype 1 30 0 0 0 0 0 300 3.00E+05 3.00E+05 1.72E+02 2.91E+01
Seaframe Package System 1 0 0 0 0 300 0 0 1.00E+05 1.00E+05 7.02E+01 4.72E+01
Package System 2 0 0 0 0 450 0 0 2.00E+05 2.00E+05 1.54E+02 1.42E+02
Package System 3 0 0 0 0 500 0 0 3.00E+05 3.00E+05 2.41E+02 2.60E+01
Comm. Comm System 1 0 40 0 180 0 100 0 1.00E+05 1.00E+05 1.26E+01 3.59E+01
Comm System 2 0 0 0 200 0 120 0 2.00E+05 2.00E+05 1.24E+02 9.83E+01
Comm System 3 0 0 0 240 0 140 0 3.00E+05 3.00E+05 2.17E+02 7.00E+01
Comm System 4 0 0 0 300 0 160 0 4.00E+05 4.00E+05 2.20E+02 3.98E+02
Comm System 5 0 0 0 360 0 180 0 5.00E+05 5.00E+05 7.03E+01 4.15E+02
Comm System 6 0 0 0 380 0 200 0 6.00E+05 6.00E+05 4.09E+02 4.62E+02
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Figure 7. Performance index frontier 
Figure 7 highlights 3 dynamic portfolios at conservatism level of   = 0.001, 
0.5, 1 respectively; increasing values of   indicate a higher degree of conservatism. 
Each point corresponding to a particular chosen level of conservatism, reflect s a 
sequence of acquisition decisions that lead to the final portfolio performance index 
denoted on the graph. The sequence of acquisitions for each level of conservatism 
is shown in Table 4, where ‘1’ denotes a decision to acquire a particular system at 
that time step, t. Figure 8 shows the normalized capability index for each subset of 
capabilities that comprise the index (in this case, weapons strike range, surface 
detection range and anti-mine detection range) of each of optimal points in Figure 7.  
The results in Table 4 indicate evolving portfolio of systems where individual 
systems are acquired and retired throughout the decision epochs, preserving the 
satisfaction of requirements, towards maximizing the end goal of the overall SoS 
portfolio at time t=T. Retirements are denoted by the evolution from a previously 
selected state (e.g. xjt=1 @t=2) to a state of (e.g. xjt=0 @t=3). At a high level of 
conservatism ( =1.0), we observe the expected case of the portfolio being constant, 
where the initial investments are held over the entire decision horizon without any 
retirement or further acquisitions; this reflects the condition where risks associated 
with the buy/retire transactions are deemed to be too great, hence prompting the 
selection of a lower capability, but less financially risky acquisition strategy. At the 
low and mid-levels of conservatism, there is a possibility of sequential acquisitions, 
(subject to the availability and compatibility rules between systems), that can result 
in higher performing portfolios, but at higher prescribed level of acquisition risk. 
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The results of a Table 4 and Figure 8 provide practitioners a candid view of 
the ‘topology’ of acquisitions that can optimally be made over time, assuming a 
tolerance of risk (in this case budgetary risk). The risk uses correlated information on 
the costs and is quantified as the probability associated with the budget constraint 
violation. The analysis result presented can be useful to decision-makers in 
assessing the potential dynamic purchasing/retirement decisions that need to be 
made in view of quantifiable uncertainties. It also allows the decision-maker to 
assess the trade-offs between performance and risks in decisions at each epoch of 
the acquisition process, while bearing independencies and system compatibilities in 
mind.  The mapping of the dynamic acquisition trade-space can also better inform 
independent acquisition groups, within a SoS, on the potential actions that various 
collaborative acquisition strategies can have on the overall scheme of development. 
Table 4. Portfolio evolution at varying conservatism 
 
System System Γ (Conservatism)
Description Package 0.001 0.5 1
t=0 t=1 t=2 t=0 t=1 t=2 t=0 t=1 t=2
ASW Variable Depth 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Multi Fcn Tow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lightweight tow 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
MCN RAMCS II 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
ALMDS (MH-60) 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
New Prototype 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
SUW N-LOS Missiles 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Griffin Missiles 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
New Prototype 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seaframe Package System 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Package System 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Communications Comm System 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Comm System 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Comm System 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Comm System 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Comm System 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Comm System 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Figure 8. Normalized capability spread at varying conservatism 
The analysis affords practitioners a candid view of the dynamic acquisition 
trade-space and allows for the selection of systems at the prescribed levels of 
accepted conservatism. In the larger context of acquisition affordability objectives, 
the algorithmic framework established here has direct bearing on BBP focus areas 
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Table 5. BBP contributions 
Better Buying Power 
Potential Contribution of Robust Multi-Period 
Portfolio Approach 
Focus Area   
    
Achieve Affordable Programs  Robust decision-making in a multi-period 
setting enables mitigation of risks and 
planning of development steps 
    
Control Lifecycle Costs   Robust multi-period portfolio accounts for 
uncertainties in transactional costs at 
each stage of the decision horizon. 
    
Incentivize Productivity and 
Innovation & Promote 
Effective Competition 
 Metrics such as KVA and piece-wise 
linear modeling of incentivizations in a 
multi-period setting can provide robust 
management of investments for  non-
tangible investments and incentivizations 
   
   Enables effective management of larger 
set of acquisition possibilities (e.g. 
contributions from SBIRs, open 
architectures) 
Method 3: Multi-Period Portfolio using Dynamic 
Programming Approaches 
The work in Method 2 relates to dealing with multi-stage portfolio 
management problem in which a warfighter performance index for a large collection 
of systems or ‘System of Systems (SoS)’. The method utilizes robust optimization 
techniques developed by Bertsimas (Bertsimas, 2004) to address correlated data 
uncertainties that may exist over the strategic horizon by treated all the potential 
decision variables over a . However, the implementation only considers static 
correlation over the entire strategic horizon – a notion that may be very difficult to 
accurately ascertain, and may not yield insights in tactical aspects in defense 
acquisition decision-making. At each decision epoch, the practitioner utilizes a 
decision-making framework to evaluate the value and risks involved in the potential 
acquisitions of new systems. Evaluation of such information can potentially come 
from prototyping/test and fielding results, or other such information seeking/risk 
reducing acquisition actions. The resulting new collection of systems that comprise 
the new portfolio, now include the addition of the new systems and identifies 
appropriate decision-paths that are necessary to achieve the target collection of 
systems. Research in this section explores the more explicit incorporation of tactical 
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information at each update, to enable subsequent epoch decision-analysis using the 
portfolio-based framework.   
Dynamic Investment Portfolio Formulation 
The dynamic acquisition problem is expressed as a mathematical 
programming problem. The process begins with the definition of two main elements 
of a mathematical program, namely, the objective function and constraints. The 
objective function reflects key performance metrics of the system to be maximized 
(or minimized). For a system of systems, the objective function reflects a chosen 
measure of performance. The second important aspect of a mathematical program 
is the formulation of the constraints. The constraints reflect physical, resource and 
behavioral aspects of the systems as mathematical expressions. Our preliminary 
framework for a multi-period portfolio considers a long term horizon of acquisitions 
with discrete decision epochs that reflect investment decisions. These decisions can 
involve acquisition actions such as the addition/removal of individual systems 
towards achieving a desired capability. 
The following mathematical program describes a preliminary framework 
towards the overall portfolio acquisition problem: 
max  
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8q TRLTRL   8q TRLCost    (Uncertain)           (42) 
Equation (35) is the weighted objective function that seeks to maximize the end 
developed portfolio performance index. Here, the index is weighted according to the 
normalized value that each capability (C) contributes to the index. The normalization 
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is performed with reference to some minimum acceptable performance value for 
each capability, Rc. Equation (36) ensures that the total ‘capabilities’ from selected 
systems are able to satisfy the requirements of connected systems that are in need 
of a particular capability. For example, there must be adequate communications 
bandwidth capability stemming from the selected communications assets, so as to 
enable performance of the weapons systems for the same naval asset. Equation 
(37) enforces compatibility constraints as binary conditions for a total of (k) set of 
rules; for example, the constraint that only one engine can be selected to generate 
power would translate to a constraint of x1 + x2 = 1 where (x1, x2) are binary 
variables. Equation (38) ensures that the costs of developing (in this case, the cost 
of promoting, via research, low Technology Readiness Level (TRL) technologies to 
an acceptable fielding level of TRL 8) and cost of acquisition are within a prescribed 
budget; this is in line with the notion of affordability where finite resources are 
considered. Equations 39 and 40 utilize a linear programming structure known as a 
Big-M approach to establish a logical expression; here the systems selected for the 
end deployment can only be of TRL level 8 and above. Equation 41 denotes the 
decision variable as being binary and the associated TRL number as being between 
0 and 8. 
Equations (35-42) constitute the overarching investment problem where the 
objective is to select and end portfolio that maximizes a warfighter portfolio 
performance index (objective function) while preserving budget and feasibility 
constraints on the readiness of technologies that need to enter to the final portfolio.  
The final acquisition costs of yet-to-be introduced systems below a TRL level 8 and 
the final TRL status (TRLq) of researched systems are considered to be uncertain. 
These uncertainties intuitively have correlated properties as the development of 
technologies for interconnected systems, would likely benefit in some cooperative 
sense. We also assume that the TRLs and costs evolve as a product of research 
investment due to defense interests – this investment-guided evolution is in line with 
current practices of proof of concept and rapid prototyping of potential technologies 
and services at various TRL levels. 
Dynamic Programming Overview 
The investment portfolio problem of Eqs. (35-42) is reflective of the need to 
maximize the end portfolio capabilities of a collection of systems that are governed 
by behavioural rules of connectivity and influenced by data uncertainty. Our prior 
multi-period portfolio work has approached the problem within the context of a robust 
optimization problem that utilized innovations in robust (correlated data) linear 
programming techniques (Bertsimas 2004); the application of the method, however, 
is strategic in nature and depends on static correlations – a notion that may not hold 
true in dynamic defence acquisition environments.  While the robust portfolio 
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framework offers useful insights, there is nevertheless a need for a dynamic 
framework that can provide useful tactical timeline decision-making support, and, 
possess good long-term evolutionary performance.  
Acquisition decisions in earlier epochs typically have a cascading implications 
on the performance and risks in subsequent decisions; this form of a problem has 
long been addressed under the premise of dynamic programming. Dynamic 
programming has evolved out of many areas of research, ranging from economics to 
modern control theory (Powell 2011). The general form of a dynamic programming 
problem can be written as the following: 
  (  )         (     )      (    )     (43) 
  (  )        { 
   
 (     
 (  )}      (44) 
where Ct() is the reward function of current time step 
St is the current state 
xt is the action taken at time (T) 
Vt+1 is the value function of being in state St+1 
  is a weighting constant,   is a set of all policies 
Eq. (43) and Eq. (44) are the deterministic and stochastic representations of the 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. Typically, these are solved using 
backward recursion, over all possible states and seek a sequence of decisions (xt) 
that maximize (or minimize) an objective function. The value of the objective is 
dictated by being in particular states (St) (here, a state, in the context of our 
acquisition problem, may be the overarching military value of current holdings of 
systems and their potential connections to future systems). The traditional means of 
solving these equations backward in time can prove to be extremely 
expensive/difficult due to many reasons that include computational intractability (also 
known as the curse of dimensionality), absence of models for future states and 
dependency on data that does not yet exist. An alternative, and highly attractive 
practice in dealing with these kind of problems involves the use of Approximate 
Dynamic Programming (ADP) approach that essentially solve the problem in a 
forward dynamic programing approach (Powell, 2011) (Bertsekas, 2005). In the 
context of a defence acquisition scenario, this is highly intuitive given that the 
structure of testing, prototyping, simulation (etc.), presents new information in a 
forward sense, to help inform decision-makers in adjusting their portfolios of 
systems. Our research complements this forward view with our multi-period portfolio 
approach, using an ADP inspired methodology.  
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Dynamic Investment Portfolio using Approximate Dynamic 
Programming (ADP) 
We formulate the investment portfolio problem (with uncertainty in TRL and 
cost) of Eqs. (35-40) as a forward dynamic programming problem where the 
objective is to sequentially update acquisition decisions as TRL and cost of potential, 
yet-to-be introduced system evolve over a discretized finite horizon.  The resulting 
forward (approximate) dynamic programming problem is then stated as: 
8
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 :  Decision variable to acquire in system (q) at time (t) 
,
p
q tx : Total portfolio of systems (q) at time (t) based on current 
value of capabilities 
,
R
q tx : Decision variable to invest in research for systems below 
TRL 8 (q) at time (t) 
 :  discount term/belief term 
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Eq. (45) is the objective function that now seeks to balance the potential gains from 
investing in ready technologies at the current decision epoch, through investment 
decision variable ( 8,
TRL
q tx
 ), against the potential for future value in the overall portfolio 
of capabilities based on the decision variable ( pqx ); note that the contribution of the 
potential future value is dependent on the maturity of a TRL level to exceed level 8. 
Eq. (46) enforces that system requirements of the end potential portfolio of systems 
are satisfied by capabilities from other connected systems. Eq. (47) enforces 
compatibility constraints. Eq. (48) ensures that combined piece-wise acquisitions of 
costs at the current decision-epoch, and the cost of researching technologies below 
TRL 8. Eq. (49) enforces the long-term budget satisfaction of the projected portfolio 
of systems. Eqs. (50-51) ensure that only TRL>8 systems can be acquired at each 
decision-epoch. Eq. (52) establishes the relationship between decision-variables 
where decisions to research certain systems ( ,
R






comprise the overall projected end portfolio of systems ( Pqx ) at the final decision 
epoch. Equation (53) denotes the decision variable as being binary and the 
associated TRL number as being between 0 and 8.The optimization problem of Eqs. 
(45-53) constitute a Binary Integer Program (BIP) and was modeled using YALMIP 
(Lofberg, 2004) within the MATLAB environment  (Mathworks, 2010), using the 
Gurobi Optimizer (Inc, 2004), solver option. The optimization problem of Eqs. (45-
51) is solved recursively over each investment decision epoch. At the end of each 
epoch, TRLs (and cost) of yet-to-be introduced systems are evolved to a new 
estimate, based on the prior epoch’s investment decision ( ,
R
q tx ) in relevant 
technology. 
Concept Application: Naval Acquisition Scenario 
We apply our developed multi-stage portfolio framework for the case of a 
Naval Acquisition Scenario. The Naval Acquisition Scenario is based on the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS 2011) system model developed by Lockheed Martin and General 
Dynamics. The design of these ships allows for modular packages to be swapped 
for execution of a range of mission scenarios that include: Mine Counter Measure 
(MCM), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Surface Warfare (SUW). Our simplified 
model consists of a hypothetical list of systems, listed in Table 6, that are available 
to the Navy for acquisition, and are presented with a corresponding Technology 
Readiness Levels (TRL). Although the number presented in the table are fictitious, 
the salient features of capability, requirements, cost and such, are represented. The 
(ASW, MCM, SUW, Unconventional Warfare) categories are the core mission 
packages, ‘Communications’ represents the support communications systems 
available for deployment. Power represents the power generation systems available 
for deployment and in support of other systems.  
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The first six columns show capabilities of each system, and their respective 
numerical valuations. Column 7 and 8 are the Power and Communications 
requirement needed for operation of the listed systems, in providing the respective 
capabilities in columns 1-6. Column 9 is the acquisition cost of the relevant system, 
assuming a TRL level of 8 or above; for systems less than this, the number is 
subject to uncertainty. Column 10 is the cost of research at each time period to 
promote a particular system’s technology towards a TRL level 8 – this can be 
thought of as a development cost.  
The recursive framework of the forward dynamic programming problem in 
Eqs. (43-50) is applied to the Naval Acquisition Scenario where the need is to evolve 
and acquire systems towards maximizing war fighter capabilities. The solution of the 
optimization at each decision epoch, assumes a value of ‘belief’ in the future states, 
as dictated by the discount term ϒ that takes a value between 0 and 1 and is 
assumed to be set by the practitioner.  The result of the optimization problem, at 




which are then also included as existing systems in the subsequent epoch. Solution 
of the optimization problem also generates a list of systems to be researched as 
denoted by variable ( ,
R
q tx ), that are then subject to a simulated dynamics of TRL 
evolution due to research investment; the evolution also generates a new cost of 
acquisition estimate for the researched systems as well. 
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The forward optimization scheme of Eqs. (43-50) is solved over six decision 
epochs, and using a choice of two levels of belief (how much to favour TRL>8 
systems in each epoch over research investment) are captured in Table 7 and Table 
8. Table 7 lists, for each degree of belief ( =1, 0.1), the acquisition of systems of 
TRL>8 at each decision epoch. A belief level of   =1 refers to a high preference 
policy on potentially investing in systems of higher value that may need research 
funding (TRL investment). A belief value of   =0.1 refers to the converse where the 
policy is to invest in assets that are more readily available at the immediate decision 
epoch. It is assumes that for each value of   used, we assume a constant value 
throughout the decision epochs. In realistic settings however, the values of   can be 
adapted at each decision epoch; this process can either be through the practitioner’s 
insights or based on algorithmic rigor. Table 8 captures the research decisions 
(investment in system to potentially upgrade TRL) towards subsequent acquisition of 
the relevant system. 
The results of Table 7 are intuitive; using a high preference value of   =1.0, 
we can observe that the recursive optimization scheme does not invest in immediate 
System Weapon Weapon Surface Anti Mine Unconv Comm. Power Power Comm. Cost of Cost of TRL
Module Package Strike Detection Detection Warfare Capacity Capacity Req. Bandwidth Acquisition Research
Range Range Range Payload Req.
(miles) (miles) (miles) (kg) (Mbps) (kW) (kW) (Mbps) (USD) (USD)
ASW Variable Depth 0 30 0 0 0 0 50 75 80000 20000 8
Multi Fcn Tow 0 40 0 0 0 0 100 125 90000 22500 6
Lightweight tow 0 50 0 0 0 0 150 150 100000 25000 6
ASW Prototype 1 0 60 0 0 0 0 175 150 120000 30000 7
ASW Prototype 2 0 70 0 0 0 0 180 100 130000 32500 7
MCM RAMCS II 0 0 30 0 0 0 100 75 80000 20000 8
ALMDS (MH-60) 0 0 40 0 0 0 150 125 90000 22500 7
MCM Prototype 1 0 0 50 0 0 0 200 150 100000 25000 7
MCM Prototype 2 0 0 60 0 0 0 250 175 120000 30000 7
MCM Prototype 3 0 0 70 0 0 0 270 185 140000 35000 7
SUW N-LOS Missiles 3 0 0 0 0 0 150 100 80000 20000 8
Griffin Missiles 25 0 0 0 0 0 200 200 90000 22500 7
SUW Prototype  1 50 0 0 0 0 0 250 300 100000 25000 7
SUW Prototype  2 60 0 0 0 0 0 200 120 120000 30000 6
SUW Prototype  3 70 0 0 0 0 0 200 300 130000 32500 6
Unconventional Package System 1 0 0 0 100 0 0 25 50 70000 17500 8
Warfare Package System 2 0 0 0 150 0 0 50 150 80000 20000 8
Package System 3 0 0 0 200 0 0 75 200 90000 22500 8
Comm. Package System 1 0 0 0 0 300 0 50 0 80000 20000 8
Package Package System 2 0 0 0 0 400 0 75 0 90000 22500 8
Package System 3 0 0 0 0 450 0 100 0 100000 25000 6
Package System 4 0 0 0 0 500 0 150 0 100000 25000 6
Package System 5 0 0 0 0 550 0 200 0 110000 27500 6
Power Package System 1 0 0 0 0 0 350 0 0 80000 20000 8
Package Package System 2 0 0 0 0 0 450 0 0 90000 22500 8
Package System 3 0 0 0 0 0 550 0 0 100000 25000 7
Package System 4 0 0 0 0 0 650 0 0 110000 27500 7
Package System 5 0 0 0 0 0 750 0 0 120000 30000 6
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systems at the early stages, but rather in the best valued TRL systems that can 
potentially improve the overall portfolio index at later stages. The ‘exploration’ 
element of researching lower TRL technologies with potentially higher payoffs is 
seen in the decision to research such systems in Table 3. For example, at   =1.0, 
the decision to acquire an ASW system is left to the latter stage at the second 
decision epoch, after ASW Prototype 2 has been researched and reached a TRL of 
8 for subsequent acquisition. At the lower level of preference,   =0.1, we observe 
that the policy favours the immediate acquisition of TRL>8 systems for short term 
gains. An acquisitions practitioner could conceivably use sequential results to select 
an appropriate policy of  , based on practitioner insights into the acquisition 
environment. Additionally, the optimization framework addresses the combinatorial 
aspects of the systems interconnectivities, accounts of acquisition sequencing and 
maximizes the potential utility of yet-to-be introduced systems by evaluating potential 
value to the overall architecture, based on investment research progress towards 
TRL 8 status.  
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Decision Epochs (Acquisitions) 
Gamma Value 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1
System
ASW Variable Depth 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Multi Fcn Tow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lightweight tow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ASW Prototype 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ASW Prototype 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
MCM RAMCS II 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
ALMDS (MH-60) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MCM Prototype 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MCM Prototype 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MCM Prototype 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
SUW N-LOS Missiles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Griffin Missiles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUW Prototype  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUW Prototype  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUW Prototype  3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
UnconventionalPackage System 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Warfare Package System 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Comm. Package System 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Package Package System 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Package System 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Power Package System 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Package Package System 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Package System 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Package System 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
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Table 8. Decision Epochs Research ( ,
R
q tx ) 
 
Summary & Contributions of Research 
The research performed in this report has explored three approaches to multi-
staged decision-making for acquisition practitioners. Namely, these approaches are 
1) policy construction for cost and schedule overruns using mechanism design 2) a 
strategic level robust multi-period portfolio problem and 3) a multi-period portfolio 
formulation that leverages decision epoch updates for sequential decision-making. 
The approaches leverage innovations in areas of system of systems engineering, 
financial engineering and operations research by providing defense acquisitions 
Decision Epochs (Research TRL) 
Gamma Value 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1 1 0.1
System
Variable Depth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Multi Fcn Tow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lightweight tow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ASW Prototype 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ASW Prototype 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RAMCS II 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ALMDS (MH-60) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MCM Prototype 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MCM Prototype 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MCM Prototype 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
N-LOS Missiles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Griffin Missiles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUW Prototype  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUW Prototype  2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUW Prototype  3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Package System 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
Package System 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 4 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 5 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Package System 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Package System 3 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Package System 5 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
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practitioners with quantitative frameworks that can alleviate some of the decision-
making complexities associated with complex trade spaces.  
Our mechanism design approach aims at using strategic level data and policy 
levers within the context of a mechanistic approach, where the underlying 
optimization problem allows for objective selection of qualitative policies towards 
potentially controlling cost and schedule growth in defense program management. 
Optimization methods from the mechanism framework are used to also construct a 
robust multi-period portfolio framework that allows practitioners to assess long term, 
multi-period decisions, and to generate long-term acquisition strategies in acquiring 
specific capabilities, while accounting for data uncertainties in the long term. Our 
third approach  extends the long-term, strategic framework of the robust portfolio 
method to account for update effects where decisions at each epoch affects 
decisions at subsequent epochs; this is addressed in a dynamic programming 
centric framework of the third method. The research work has led to the following 
advancements in support of acquisition decisions:  
1. Quantitative supportive frameworks that alleviate some of the decision-
making difficulties associated with complex acquisition tradespaces. 
This enables the end practitioner to navigate decision-spaces with 
fewer dimensions, in their decision-making process. 
2. Multi-staged decision support of sequentially interdependent decisions; 
our frameworks are amenable to addressing the inherent 
dependencies through physical, functional and temporal dimensions of 
the acquisition process. 
3.  The approaches account for the roles of data uncertainties in the 
formulation; this allows for the practitioner to utilize a priori knowledge 
in determining how much risk/uncertianty should strategies be 
protected against, using algorithmic innovations in the frameworks 
presented.  
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